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ABSTRACT
Seventeen percent of the average monthly cellular phone bill in
2004 was comprised of federal, state, and local taxes. As the
number of wireless subscribers across the nation continues to
increase, states, cities, and counties are increasingly seizing upon
cellular taxation as a panacea for budget shortfalls. The Maryland
Tax Court’s recent decision in T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Department
of Finance for Baltimore City held state and county taxes on the
sale of individual cellular lines as legal excise taxes rather than
illegal sales taxes. This iBrief will highlight the origins of
telecommunications taxation, examine the ruling in T-Mobile in
detail, present the arguments in opposition to disproportional
cellular taxation, and conclude by anticipating what the future
might hold for the cellular industry.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
The cellular phone industry has experienced tremendous growth in
the United States recently, with the number of subscribers nationwide
increasing from 16 million in 1993, to 163 million in 2003, 2 to over 207
million by the end of 2005. 3 State and local governments have rushed to
meet this expansion in volume with taxation. 4 Officials are particularly
eager to tax cellular phones because the charges to individuals each month
are often small enough to go unnoticed but in the aggregate are capable of
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generating substantial revenue. 5 This revenue is so substantial in practice,
in fact, that cellular phone subscribers paid an estimated $17.8 billion in
federal, state, and local taxes in 2004. 6 Several major taxes are primarily
responsible for this staggering figure. First, the federal government applies
a series of taxes to every cellular carrier, ranging from the federal regulatory
fee imposed by the FCC to defray its operating costs, to the federal
universal service fee, a tax designed to subsidize service to high cost service
areas. 7
These federal charges are variable but in 2005 totaled
approximately 6% of the average bill. 8 The U.S. Department of Treasury’s
recent decision to terminate collection of the 3% federal excise tax
beginning July 31, 2006 after five Courts of Appeals declared it illegal will
reduce wireless carriers’ burdens accordingly. 9
¶2
Second, after the federal taxes are applied to a wireless bill, state
and local levies are administered. States, cities, counties, and municipalities
tax cellular lines in a variety of ways, including sales taxes, use taxes,
excise taxes, gross receipts taxes, and additional universal service fund
fees. 10 The sum of these charges varies dramatically from state to state,
ranging from a low of 1.11% in Nevada to a high of 16.21% in
Washington. 11

When these manifold state and federal taxes are combined, the
results are quite dramatic—total cellular phone taxes in 2004 amounted to
17% of the average customer’s bill. 12 This tax rate is roughly double that
applied to other services and is surpassed only by the high tax rates 13

¶3
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assessed against the alcohol, drug, and petroleum industries. 14 Taxation of
wireless communication at such exorbitant levels is counterproductive and
is unsupported by the historic justifications for telecommunications taxes. 15
A brief survey of the history of taxation within this field serves to
underscore this conclusion.

I. THE ORIGINS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TAXATION
¶4
Federal taxation of the telecommunications industry dates back to
the early twentieth century. 16 The recently eviscerated federal excise tax 17
was established by the federal government in 1898 as a temporary levy on
what was then a luxury service—long-distance telephone communication—
in order to help fund the Spanish-American War. 18 The excise tax was
repealed in 1902 but was reintroduced during World War I. 19 In 1941, it
was expanded to apply to local telephone calls and was used to help finance
World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. 20
¶5
In recent years, however, public outcry against the imposition of the
federal excise tax has increased. Citizens objected to the disproportional
taxation of communication in particular as it ceased to be a luxury service.
This outcry was validated when five Courts of Appeals declared the federal
excise tax illegal as applied, 21 leading the U.S. Treasury Department to
announce recently that it would no longer require providers to apply the tax
to cellular and long-distance customers. 22 This decision marks an
appropriate return to the principles that animated federal
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telecommunications taxation at its inception and constitutes a step towards
the proper recalibration of such taxation to fit modern society.
¶6
State taxation of the telecommunications industry likewise dates to
the early twentieth century and also has ceased to be supported by its
original justifications. 23 In the industry’s formative and developmental
years, the general economic assumption was that the most efficient
mechanism for growth was the granting of statewide monopolies. 24 In
return for the exclusive right to furnish phone services within a given state’s
borders, a monopolist company would be subject to lofty industry-specific
taxation. 25 This taxation was enacted and administered by states with the
implicit provision that the telecommunications provider would then be
permitted to set rates at a level that would allow it to recoup its fees from
consumers. 26

With the advent of competitive markets in the telecommunications
industry, the justifications for industry-specific taxation disappeared. 27
When cellular companies entered the market without state-granted
monopolies, without the use of public rights-of-way, and without any of the
previously attendant opportunities for recoupment, industry-specific
taxation became an anachronism. 28 State taxation of telecommunications
has simply failed to keep pace with the revolutionary changes in the
market. 29 In fact, instead of decreasing, the effective rate of state and local
taxation has increased in recent years. 30 This simply cannot be justified.
¶7

The city and local taxes at issue in T-Mobile USA, Inc. v.
Department of Finance for Baltimore City 31 are perfect examples of the
recently prolific departure from the original rationale for disproportional
taxation of the telecommunications industry. Instead of being related in any
way to monopoly power or controlled ratemaking, such taxation simply
represents an effort to remedy budget shortfalls by the arbitrary and
convenient taxation of cellular providers. 32
¶8
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II. THE T-MOBILE DECISION
¶9
In July 2003, Maryland’s Montgomery County amended its
Telephone Tax ordinance to include the imposition of a $2 per month tax on
every cellular line sold to a resident of the county. 33 In August 2004,
Baltimore implemented a Wireless Telecommunications Tax that levied a
$3.50 per month tax on each line sold. 34 These two jurisdictions enacted
their respective taxes by taking advantage of their special status as
Maryland’s Charter Home Rule County and Charter Home Rule City,
respectively. 35 This status allowed the two local governments to impose
certain taxes without securing specific authorization from the Maryland
General Assembly. 36

Cellular providers T-Mobile, Cingular, Sprint, and Verizon
Wireless joined forces in opposing the two taxes, both as they were being
drafted and after they were implemented. 37 The providers argued that
because Maryland had designed a system in which the state taxed wireless
communications while granting local governments the authority to tax
public utilities, including land-line communications, the Baltimore City and
Montgomery County levies imposed a burden upon cellular users that
exceeded that imposed upon land-line users. 38 The providers asserted that
this disproportional taxation unfairly resulted in one segment of taxpayers,
namely the cellular industry and its customers, funding the general
obligations of the local government. 39 These arguments fell on deaf ears,
even as Baltimore collected $9.98 million in the first year of its tax, and as
Montgomery County took in roughly $45 million from the tax’s inception in
2003 to 2005. 40
¶10

¶11
In addition to arguing that these industry-specific taxes were
inequitable, the four wireless companies asserted that the taxes were illegal
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as well. 41 Maryland state law explicitly precludes cities and counties from
imposing sales or use taxes, except on utilities, and wireless carriers are not
encompassed by the statutory definition of “utilities.” 42 Convinced of the
merits of their case, the providers determined to seek legal relief. 43 Because
Maryland law requires taxpayers challenging local taxation to first seek
administrative remedies, the carriers filed refund claims in December 2004
with the appropriate authorities of Montgomery County and Baltimore for
the amounts paid under the respective taxes. 44 When both localities issued
final determinations denying refund claims, the wireless companies filed
suit in the Maryland Tax Court. 45

A. The Maryland Tax Court’s Holding
¶12
The Maryland Tax Court is an “independent agency [that] provides
the highest administrative level in the state and local tax-related appeals
process.” 46 The Tax Court consolidated the individual carriers’ cases
against Montgomery County and Baltimore for the purpose of determining
the “only remaining legal issue,” in particular “whether the tax on mobile
communications service is an impermissible sales tax.” 47 The court’s
holding on this issue would be pivotal. A ruling that the city and county
taxes were impermissible sales taxes would mark a substantial victory for
the cellular industry, halting the tide of local taxation and making it
substantially more difficult for localities to enact industry-specific levies. A
ruling affirming the taxes as viable would have the opposite effect of
encouraging counties, cities, and municipalities nationwide to augment their
budgets by applying extensive taxation to the cellular industry while
passing it off as unrelated to sales.
¶13
The Maryland Tax Court wasted little time in indicating that it
would rule in favor of Baltimore and Montgomery County. In the first few
paragraphs of its Memorandum of Grounds for Decision, it referred to the
Baltimore City tax as an “excise tax” and emphasized that the Montgomery
County tax was applied to any entity that “furnishes”—not “sells”—cellular
lines.48 Having established this groundwork, the court went on to apply

41

Id. at 2.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 3.
45
Id. at 4.
46
Maryland Tax Court, http://www.txcrt.state.md.us/ (last visited Nov. 16,
2006).
47
T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Dept. of Finance for Baltimore City, 2006 WL
1976188 at *1 (Md. Tax Ct. Jun. 29, 2006).
48
Id.
42

2006

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 20

Maryland precedent to hold the taxes in question permissible as local excise
taxes, not sales taxes, and to reject the carriers’ refund claims. 49
The court relied almost exclusively on a single case, Montgomery
County v. Maryland Soft Drink Ass’n, Inc. 50 in reaching its conclusion.
In Soft Drink, the Maryland Court of Appeals set forth a two-factor test for
determining whether a given tax may properly be conceived of as a sales
tax. 51 The first requirement is that a taxable sale be the event that triggers
payment of the tax. 52 Second, the tax must be applied against the purchase
price of the good or service involved in the taxable sale. 53
¶14

¶15
The Maryland Tax Court held that the levies in question in TMobile failed to satisfy either the “event” or “application” prong of the SoftDrink test. 54 The cellular providers had argued that the relevant taxable
event was the sale of a wireless line to a customer and that the tax was
applied to the purchase price of each line. 55 Although this argument in fact
captured the reality of the taxes being imposed, the court rejected it
outright. 56 Instead it held that “the furnishing or providing the wireless line
is the taxable event for the purposes of this tax . . . whether through a sale or
otherwise” and that the tax was applied to “the number of lines furnished by
the wireless company during the month.” 57

B. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning
With respect to the first prong of Soft Drink—the taxable event—
the court heavily emphasized the determination that both the Baltimore and
Montgomery County taxes were applicable to all lines “provided or
furnished, whether through a sale or otherwise.” 58 The court even went so
far as to state that “it is unnecessary to consider the economic transaction
between the wireless company and the customer.” 59 Yet, the very nature of
the cellular phone industry makes disregarding the economic transaction
entirely inappropriate. The localities were taxing each line that a carrier
provided to a customer. Certainly, the wide variety of pricing plans in the
cellular industry could lead to a situation in which a phone and number
would be provided to a customer for free, if accompanied by the
¶16
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commencement of a service agreement. But, phone lines and their
accompanying service are not donated by cellular carriers to their
customers; they are sold. The monthly tax is collected from each line, and
each line is part of a sale of cellular phone service. Semantics aside, the
first prong was determined to be unfulfilled erroneously.
¶17
With respect to the second prong, application to purchase price, the
Tax Court held that “the telephone tax does not satisfy the second
identifying characteristic of a sales tax as set forth in Soft Drink.” 60 The
Court continued: “[R]egardless of whether a customer ever uses, or is billed
for, a wireless line, the telephone tax is due at the stated rate per month.” 61
Again, this ruling disregards the reality of the cellular industry. Adding a
$2.00 or $3.50 surcharge to a monthly cellular phone bill is absolutely a tax
upon that bill. While it is certainly true that the applied rate of tax is
dependent upon the customer’s balance for a given month, it remains the
case that the tax is being added each month to the price of the cellular phone
line.
¶18
Nevertheless, the Maryland Tax Court disagreed and rejected the
refund claims brought by T-Mobile, Cingular, Sprint, and Verizon Wireless.
The court concluded in unequivocal fashion, decreeing that “[a] flat tax on a
telephone line, which does not vary depending on customer usage, is an
excise tax rather than a sales tax under Maryland law.” 62 The ramifications
of this decision are likely to be profound. The Tax Court has signaled to
cities, counties, towns, and municipalities that their efforts to impose
inordinately high tax rates upon the cellular industry will be rewarded.
Rather than taking a step towards reducing the peculiarly high tax rates
imposed upon a non-harmful, non-monopolistic industry, the Maryland Tax
Court provided an invitation for local governments to lift those rates even
higher.

III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST DISPROPORTIONAL CELLULAR TAXATION
¶19
The arguments in opposition to taxation of the cellular industry at
rates that are disproportional to those applied to similar fields are manifold
and will be briefly enumerated here.
¶20
First, disproportional taxation harms the telecommunications
industry as it relates to other industries, placing a burden upon
telecommunications that is simply not present in comparable fields. 63 The
tax structure applied to telecommunications makes it among the highest
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taxed industries in the U.S. economy. 64 Only the alcohol, tobacco, and
petroleum industries have higher tax rates, and this is for socially and
economically justifiable reasons. 65 Alcohol and tobacco taxes stem from
their respective industries’ extraordinarily high associated social and health
costs. 66 Petroleum taxes are user fees or benefit taxes; the proceeds from
such levies are often dedicated to maintaining and improving intra- or
interstate transportation infrastructures. 67 There are no such considerations
present in the cellular industry. Cellular phones do not impose these kinds
of substantial health, social, or infrastructure costs on society; that their
taxation is on par with products that do is unjustifiable. 68
Second, disproportional taxation harms the telecommunications
industry internally by decreasing incentive for investment. 69 The
imposition of excessive taxes upon cellular providers discourages them
from increasing research and development expenditures and reduces their
commitment to increasing and enhancing their infrastructure. 70 The irony is
that state officials and economic experts are “intent on expanding
investment in telecommunications infrastructure to expand the availability
of ‘broadband’ service to more households and businesses.” 71 In fact, an
animating concern in the federal government’s recent repeal of the federal
excise tax was just this; as Senator John McCain stated, “Today’s
telecommunications services should not be taxed as utilities so that
companies can invest in broadband and other networks.” 72 If state and local
governments are sincere in their interest in increasing industry-wide
investment in infrastructure, they must abandon disproportional taxation.
¶21

¶22
Finally, as mentioned above, the justifications for supporting
elevated rates of taxation in the telecommunications industry have long
since vanished and cannot continue to be used as cover for state and local
governments to remedy their budget shortfalls. Federal taxation of
telecommunications was initiated via the federal excise tax in 1898 as a tax
upon what was then a luxury good, for the purpose of financing the
Spanish-American War. 73 The Spanish-American War is over, long
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distance telephone calls are no longer a luxury item, and the federal
government has appropriately abandoned application of this outdated tax to
cellular communications. Anachronistic state and local rates of taxation,
however, remain from the days of “Ma Bell,” telephone monopolies, and
controlled ratemaking. 74 In fact, not only do these rates remain, but they are
increasing, and almost exclusively because local governments have
discovered the ease and profitability with which they can be collected. 75
The president of Baltimore’s City Council, Sheila Dixon, said it best in
describing how the Wireless Communications Tax at issue in T-Mobile
single-handedly remedied the city’s budget crisis, “I can’t remember the last
time we had such an easy budget year. . . . [W]hen you can’t diversify and
the federal and state taxes are drying up, you need other income.” 76 Until it
is judicially or legislatively affirmed that the justifications for
disproportionately high taxation of the cellular industry have long ceased to
remain valid, city and local governments will continue their plunder.

IV. CONCLUSION
¶23
The future of telecommunications taxation is highly uncertain.
State and local lawmakers in California, Massachusetts, New York, and
other states are currently considering hundreds of new cellular tax
proposals. 77 The decision handed down by the Maryland Tax Court in TMobile will only serve to embolden localities searching for a plentiful,
legally-enforceable source of income. On the other hand, multiple bills
seeking to limit or freeze such cellular phone taxation are in the works in
Congress, including one that recently garnered the near-unanimous support
of the Senate Commerce Committee. 78 That proposal, which passed by a
twenty-two to one vote but is expected to encounter some resistance on the
Senate floor, would enact a three-year moratorium on new state cell phone
taxes, prohibiting states from instituting any levies that single out wireless
providers for additional taxation. 79 The proposed legislation would not,
however, prevent states from enacting new measures that affect the
telecommunications industry uniformly, providing a loophole for levies that
apply new charges to cellular communications and land-line
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communications equivalently. 80 It also would have no effect on existing
laws against cellular providers. 81
¶24
The next few years will likely be determinative of the future of
cellular taxation. Perhaps cellular consumers, fed up with constantly
increasing charges, will object loudly enough to halt or even reverse the
trend of escalating taxation. On the other hand, perhaps consumer objection
alone will not be capable of stemming the tide. It seems just as likely that
in the absence of stronger, much more aggressive federal legislation, city
and local governments will continue to administer elevated taxes against the
telecommunications industry as the Maryland example proves. Localities
need money to operate, and with wireless providers as an easy target,
decisions such as T-Mobile will only encourage the trend of disproportional
taxation to continue.
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